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Relying upon a rich and unique panel of Hungarian firms over 7 years, from 1992 up to 1998, this
paper estimates simultaneously TFP, Total Factor Productivity, identified as efficiency, and the
parameters of a model where investment depends upon internal funds, wages, and sales, as in
Prasnikar J. and Svejnar J. (2000). It shows that while real investment is higher in foreign firms,
the improvement in efficiency due to investment is significantly higher in Hungarian domestic
firms. We test the possibility that this higher than average foreign investment may exacerbate
other firms credit constraints by crowding them out of domestic capital markets. Of course one
must control for that foreign firms may simply be more profitable and have access to more
collateral, hence be a better investment for lending institutions. All firms (foreign, private and
domestically owned, and State-owned) are credit rationed, including foreign firms. State-owned
firms do not have an investment behaviour compatible with profit maximisation, a result which
emphasises the soft budget constraint persistence (but not through the providing with soft credit).
For these firms, wages increase together with investment.
JEL Classification : E22, G32, P21, D21, D92
Key Words: Investment, Credit rationing, Soft budget constraint, Ownership, Transition to a
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Non-technical summary
1.  Contrary to other transition countries, like Bulgaria, Romania (see Budina and alii, 2000),
or even the Czech Republic (see Estrin and alii, 2001), transition seems to be over in
Hungary in the sense that the soft budget constraint has been significantly reduced. In
particular, the banking system does not more provide (State-owned) loss makers with
cheap credit, allowing them to survive despite their losses.
2.  The decade has been characterised by a significant decrease in investment, which could
have been justified in the first years for restructuring purposes, but now might jeopardise
further restructuring. In the paper we test the credit rationing assumption, which is
validated for all categories of ownership.
3.  Domestic private firms are no less efficient than foreign firms, but, although the elasticity
of efficiency with respect to investment is lower for the latter, they are exposed to a much
larger credit rationing. This credit rationing is partially the consequence of their crowding
out by foreign firms. Anyway, one policy implication is that improving the way credit is
distributed towards domestic firms would probably enhance overall efficiency.
4.  For what regards the EU enlargement towards CECs (Central European Countries), the
Hungarian case might suggest that one way of making domestic firms more efficient (and
more able to compete in the international market) would be to improve their access to
credit.
5.  Finally one specific feature of the Hungarian transition is the economic weight of foreign
firms: whatever the indicator (total assets, labour, investment), foreign firms seem to be
at the core of the economic recovery and growth in Hungary. One implication for other
transition countries would be that being more efficient than domestic firms, these firms
are in a position of easing the economic restructuring of a country deprived for a long
period of time from any access to international competition and international markets.
The diffusion of expertise, the existence of technological spillovers, the example of the
proper corporate governance scheme, constitute positive externalities. Nevertheless, one
should be aware that discouraged (domestic) firms might well exit in the long run,
particularly if they face unequal conditions on the financial market.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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Introduction
For explaining the firms improvement in efficiency during the transition process, one usually
stresses the role of macroeconomic adjustment which induces the deep and painful
microeconomic restructuring at the core of the transition success. In the earlier years of
transition, the key for recovering is both addressing the problem of capacity under-utilization
and hardening the budget constraint, while because of hazard moral and adverse selection
banks are providing loss makers with cheap credit
1. Then investment becomes an important
factor of economic growth, particularly in the new private sector.
In market economies one important impediment to an optimal and unbiased level of
investment is that certain firms
2 might face a credit rationing implying that the level of
investment is correlated with internal funds, while for other (unconstrained) firms this
correlation does not exist. In transition economies, the argument has to be balanced against
that telling that the distortion may work in the opposite way, and that unconstrained firms
may be firms already indebted, benefiting from repeated bailouts, and nevertheless provided
with external finance despite their losses. The soft budget constraint can therefore be
revealed through the distorted access to financial market. Complementary evidence is the
loosening of central controls in the absence of competitive pressures and the control by
workers-insiders which can translate into excessive wage increases and have an impact on
investment through the trade-off between investment and wage increases. For assessing the
extent to which the soft budget constraint still works in Hungary, we estimate an Euler
equation where investment is determined by three factors, the arbitrage between investment
and wage increases, the output demand which in the neoclassical and accelerator models of
investment enhances investment, and the availability of internal funds.
We estimate in section 1 two measures of efficiency, which are Total Factor Productivity
computed from a Cobb-Douglas technology excluding and including property dummies. The
relative share of investment in foreign firms is significantly higher than that of other firms in
the sample, but the elasticity of efficiency with respect to investment is lower than that of
private and domestically owned enterprises. Under the assumption that the technology is
concave, this results suggests that Hungarian firms are on a point where the marginal
productivity of capital is higher than where foreign firms stand. If marginal productivity of
capital is higher in Hungarian firms, the question of whether domestic firms, either privately
                                                     
1 Subsequently investment behaviors might become more important, and indeed it is identified as an
indicator of deep microeconomic restructuring (Grosfeld and Roland (1997)).
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or State-owned, may be crowed out by foreign firms has to be asked (in section 3). Based
upon the Euler equation mentioned above, section 2 shows that a credit market imperfection
holds for all categories of firms, including State owned firms, contrary to the assumption of
the failure of the banking system to enforce an efficient allocation of funds by distorting the
access to external funds for the less efficient firms in the sample
3.
Section 1: Efficiency by category of firms, Investment
The dataset used in this paper is extremely rich and representative; it covers all registered
enterprises with at least 20 employees on average, between 1993 and 1998. It contains
balance sheets, income statements, structure of ownerships, and number of employees. The
individual and time structure allows to perform the usual panel analysis. All figures are
nominal and deflated using a two-digit sector price index, which was obtained from the
Central Statistical Office.
The values of equity owned by respectively the State, Hungarians, and Foreigners are
reported and allow to control for different categories of ownership: foreign versus domestic
private. The dualistic approach distinguishing foreign from domestic firms is particularly
required for Hungary, given the strategy of radical openness towards FDI and access to
ownership by foreigners implemented by the Hungarian authorities
4.
Table 1 in the annex reports the means, standard deviations, and numbers of observations for
all variables used throughout the paper. For some size variables, like total assets and the
number of employees, State-owned firms turn out to be much bigger, at least at the beginning
of the period. However one can observe a significant decrease in these variables over the
decade (for the average number of employees, by a factor of no less than 30%
5). By contrast
the difference, in particular between State-owned and foreign enterprises, is no more
significant when one looks at net sales revenues: 1 083 468 thousands forints for foreign
firms over the period, but only 1 031 624 thousands forints for State-owned firms.
By looking at some selected indicators of performance, the picture is slightly different. State-
owned firms are no more first in the ranking: (annual) net sales revenues by employee reach
only 2253 thousands forints, while for foreign firms the figure is twice as big (5211
                                                                                                                                                       
priori groupings, see Hubbard (1998).
3 The situation in CEECs seems to be quite contrasted : Estrin and al. (1993) show that banks with large
amount of bad loans seem to monitor new credits in a satisfactory way. This is not the case in Bulgaria,
see Budina Nina and al. (2001).
4 In Laslo Halpern and Gabor Korosi (2000), different measures of (in-)efficiency indicate a strong
differentiation between foreign and domestic enterprises. State-owned enterprises are not found to be
much less efficient than domestic private owned firms, which implies that the unequal efficiency can
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thousands forints). For what regards payment to employees, state-owned firms pay an average
amount of 465, while foreign firms pay a slightly higher amount, 594. The same picture, but
much more pronounced, can be drawn from the trading profit by employee variable, whom
means are respectively 143 and 594.
Hungarian firms investment, roughly computed as the increase (decrease) in real terms in
total assets minus depreciation charges, is very low over the whole period (and negative: -
226 379 thousands forints)), except foreign firms investment, which is positive and averaged
over the period represents 71 132 thousands forints. Investment breaks up in the first years of
the transition process. But from 93-94 onwards it recovers firmly: in 1998 it is again positive
and represents respectively 97 444 thousands forints (State-owned firms), - 4143 thousands
forints (private domestic firms), and 120 596 thousands forints (foreign firms).
These preliminary statistics suggests several facts that are well-known in the transition
countries: private domestic firms, either privatised or de novo firms, are generally smaller
than State-owned firms, in terms of employment (particularly) or total assets. Ownership
structure matter, the performance of private entities being better than that of State-owned.
And finally while investment drops hugely in the first years, one can observe a significant
recovery in the following years.
One specific feature in Hungary, emphasised in Table 1, is the dualistic structure of the
economy: the presence and economic weight of foreign firms is striking. The latter invest
more, and according to the efficiency indicators provided in table 1 (trading profit by
employee, wage payment, net sale revenue by employee), they are apparently more efficient
than their Hungarian counterpart.
1.1: Efficiency
In that section we estimate in a more traditional way firm level efficiencies. Total factor
productivity (TFP hereafter) is derived from the following two basic equations:
Log(Y(i,t)) = constant +c year + a log(L(i,t)) + b log(K(i,t)) + v(i,t) + u(i) (Eq.1)
Or equivalently :
y(i,t) = constant +c year + a l (i,t) + b k (i,t) + v(i,t) + u(i) (Eq. 1b)
Log(Y(i,t)) = constant +c year + a log(L(i,t)) + b log(K(i,t)) + ej propj + v(i,t) + u(i) (Eq.2)
Or equivalently :
y(i,t) = constant +c year + a l (i,t) + b k (i,t) + ej propj + v(i,t) + u(i) (Eq.2b)
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Where :
L(i,t) is the average number of employees at date t;
K(i,t) is the total assets at date t (in thousands of forints);
Y(i,t) are net sales revenues at date t (in thousands of forints);
Propj indicates the share in percent of equities owned by the State, by Hungarian firms, and
by Foreigners.
U(i) is the fixed effect picking up firms heterogeneity, the residual v(i,t) has the usual
properties (that is normally distributed with zero mean and constant standard error).
We define TFP in two different manners:
TFP including the effect of corporate governance, which is assumed to depend upon the
ownership structure of the firms (more private firms are expected to be more efficient). TFP
is computed as the residual from equations 1 and 1b where property variables are not
included as explanatory variables
6.
TFP net of the quality of the corporate governance scheme, computed as the residual u(i) in
equation 2 or 2b.
Results are reported in tables 1 and 2. The propj  dummy  coefficients imply that TFP
decreases when the share of equities owned by the State increases, and conversely increases,
by the same magnitude, when the share of either foreign or domestic private increases. As a
consequence TFP including the effect of ownership structure is lower in the sub-sample of
State-owned firms. Although the discrepancy between the two measures of efficiency
(including and excluding the effect of corporate governance) in, say, State-owned and private
domestic firms, is significantly reduced
7, efficiency is still significantly lower in State-owned
firms even when we take away the ownership structure component of efficiency (see table 1).
One possible interpretation is that the distribution of efficiency across firms cannot be
reduced to different endowments in corporate governance and management skills, as proxied
by the share of equities owned by private entities. Some authors argue indeed that ownership
and competitive pressure are complementary, which implies that a change in ownership, if
not reinforced by the proper competition institutions, does not necessarily influence firm
                                                     
6 A similar interpretation for  the fixed effect can be found in Cull and Xu (2000) : « the interpretation
of the coefficients for the financial variables changes with the inclusion of firm dummies. The
coefficients reflect effects net of those due to bank screening based on firm heterogeneity, effects for
instance due to monitoring. » (page 16).
7 In other words, the difference between –0.36 and 0.12 in table 1 is higher than that between –0.13 and
0.012. This is because the former measure of efficiency includes corporate governance, proxied here by
the propj variables, which is higher in private firms and lower in State-owned firms.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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performance
8. This would explain why privatisation succeeded in some countries, mainly in
Central Europe, and failed in others, like CIS, Romania, Bulgaria. In the case of Hungary, we
keep in mind (1) that State-owned firms are definitely less efficient than other firms in the
sample, even by controlling for the ownership structure
9, (2) that domestic private firms turn
out (somehow surprisingly ?) to be as efficient as foreign firms. Our objective is now to
explore the interaction between TFP and investment, then to answer the question whether
foreign firms might have crowed out domestic firms.




Equities owned by the State -0.200 -3.078
Equities owned by domestic
private firms
0.125 1.929






Number of observations 30 719
Number of groups 8107
Returns to scale in table 2 are increasing
10.
1.2: Investment
If investment were accumulated by firms recording the lower efficiency score, it would imply
the possibility that the allocation of credit is biased towards less profitable firms, and that a
process of credit rationing, where bad firms would no more be provided with cheap credit,
would contribute to hardening the budget constraint. In Hungary, such a policy implication is
not likely to be adapted to the economic situation
11: average investment, as seen in the above
section, is negative – which could end up with a credit crunch (as emphasised in Calvo and
Coricelli (1994)) – hence a more relevant issue is that of a possible market imperfection
implying that firms, whatever their efficiency, are credit rationed. The answer has to be
balanced: investment is significantly higher in foreign firms, which are also more efficient
than State-owned firms in the sample, but private domestic firms, although as efficient as
foreign firms, do not invest as much.
                                                     
8 See Estrin and alii (2001), Grosfeld and Tressel (2001).
9 Even if controlling reduces the gap in efficiency.
10 The same result of increasing returns was found in Laslo Halpern and Gabor Korosi (2000).
11 While according to Budina Nina and al. (2001) credit rationing in Bulgaria is harder amongst privateWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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Another question regards the nature of the externality produced by foreign firms on the
domestic market. For Estrin and alii (2001): “If competition between similarly productive and
technologically advanced firms might eventually lead to restructuring and to improved
performance, the presence of much better firms in the same market may discourage enterprise
restructuring”. One explanation is that discouraged enterprises are exiting in the long run.
Another explanation, which we explore here, is that better (foreign) firms might force
domestic firms to exit simply by crowing them out, via financial market (they have an easier
access, whatever domestic or international, to capital) and via product market (banks prefer to
provide foreign firms with the available credit).
In table 3, the explained variable is the yearly share of funds, in per cent of total positive
funds, invested by State-owned firms, Hungarian private firms, and foreign firms
12. Given
that for most observations, real investment is null or even negative, an Heckman procedure is
required
13. The probability for State-owned firms of registering positive values of investment
is significantly lower; furthermore, the probability for foreign firms of investing is 10 points
higher than for Hungarian private firms. Given those differentiated probabilities, Hungarian
private firms invest more than State-owned firms. The coefficient is positive and set equal to
0.21, while not significantly different from zero in the case of State-owned firms.
Furthermore, foreign firms are not only likely to invest more, but their investment is also
significantly dramatically higher (with a coefficient reaching 0.63). These results corroborate
the simple means reported in table 1.
In table 4 we focus on the correlation between investment and our two measures of
efficiency, gross and net of property structure. Proceeding that way we are really able to
capture the link between improvement in the ratio of output on inputs (allowed by any
technical progress or whatever), that is between efficiency, pure of the corporate
governance’s quality (which does not depend upon the amount of investment), and
investment itself.
                                                                                                                                                       
firms, and softer in firms provided with cheap credit (corresponding to bad loans).
12 For clarity purpose State-owned firms, co-operatives, and non profit institutions are merged together.
Notice that co-operatives and non profit institutions represent a small share of the total.
13 where both the probability for real investment to be positive, and then the structural equation, are
estimated.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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Table 3: investment shares estimates
Structural Equation Coefficients Z statistics
Dummy set equal to one when
the majority of equities is owned
by the State
0.005 3.33
Dummy set equal to one when
the majority of equities is owned
by private domestic firms
0.212 144.87
Dummy set equal to one when




Selection Equation Coefficients Z statistics
Dummy set equal to one when
the majority of equities is owned
by the State
-0.245 -5.72
Dummy set equal to one when
the majority of equities is owned
by private domestic firms
0.205 5.18
Dummy set equal to one when









Table 4 confirms the statistics in table 1, reflecting that efficiency (whatever gross or net)
reaches the same value in Hungarian private firms and in foreign firms, but is significantly
lower in State-owned firms. The average elasticity of efficiency with respect to investment,
estimated at 0.087, is significant and positive.
By assuming now that the elasticity of efficiency with respect to investment might differ
across firms, we find indeed that the degree of significance is dramatically weakened in the
sub-sample of State-owned firms; nevertheless it remains significant (but only at 10%) if we
consider efficiency net of the ownership structure. One possible objection is that State-owned
firms investment is negative all during the period; but dis-investment could in principle
enhance efficiency and reflect an adjustment process where the general over capacities of the
firms would be reduced to a more efficient level. Given the absence of any strong correlation
between the decline in assets and efficiency, this assumption is not validated.
Now the efficiency of investment in improving TFP is much (twice) higher in the sub-sample
of Hungarian private firms that in the sub-sample of foreign firms. The marginal productivity
of an incremental unit of capital is therefore higher in the former group, where both the stockWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
8
and flow of productive capital are lower. This is another important result, which stress the
importance of the crowding out hypothesis to be tested.
Table 4 : efficiency elasticity with respect to investment
Net TFP : controlling for the effect of corporate governance
Overall sample State-owned Firms Hungarian Private Firms Foreign Firms
Real investment 0.087*** 0.014* 0.12*** 0.051***
Dummy set equal to one
when the majority of
equities is owned by the
State
-0.288***
Dummy set equal to one
when the majority of
equities is owned by
private domestic firms
-0.094***
Dummy set equal to one
when the majority of
equities is owned by
foreign firms
-0.131***
Constant 0.535*** -0.084* 0.57*** 0.245***
Gross TFP : not controlling for the effect of corporate governance
Real investment 0.087*** 0.006 0.122*** 0.049***
Dummy set equal to one
when the majority of
equities is owned by the
State
-0.481***
Dummy set equal to one
when the majority of
equities is owned by
private domestic firms
-0.072
Dummy set equal to one
when the majority of
equities is owned by
foreign firms
-0.069
Constant 0.544*** -0.302*** 0.607*** 0.307***
***: significant at 1 percent; *: significant at 10 percent.
Section 2: investment behavior
According to the results of the previous analysis, both the distribution of investment and its
impact on efficiency are differentiated by category of ownership. We are going to test now
that the access to external credit is limited by capital market imperfections, and that firms are
not indifferent between raising external funds and using internal resources. The following
investment equation, which corresponds to the model in Prasnikar and Svejnar (2000), is
estimated :William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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Log (I/L) = a0 + a1 log(Tr/L) + a2 cov + a3 log(yL/L) + a4 log(R/L) + u(i) + v(t)(Eq.3)
Equivalently :
Invr = a0 + a1 tr + a2 cov + a3 ylr + a4 rlr + u(i) + v(t) (Eq.4)
Where I is the firm’s gross real investment (total asset (t) minus total asset (t-1) minus
depreciation charge at t;
Tr denotes the firm’s real trading profit;
Cov is the interest coverage ratio, computed as the ratio of the firm’s interest expenses to the
sum of the firm’s interest expenses plus cash flow;
yL is the total labor cost per worker times the average number of employees;
R is the real sale revenue of the firm;
L is the average number of employees;
Table 5 : investment equation
Overall sample State-Owned Firms
Tr 0.059*** 0.033*** 0.059*** 0.0324*** 0.112*** 0.068*** 0.101*** 0.060***
Cov -0.397*** -0.409*** -0.809*** -0.771***
Rlr 0.235*** 0.2505*** 0.282*** 0.299*** -0.207*** -0.152*** -0.323*** -0.262***
Ylr -0.151*** -0.159*** 0.537*** 0.487***
Number of
observations
15 694 15 694 15 691 15 691 778 778 778 778
Hungarian Private Firms Foreign Firms
Tr 0.061*** 0.0379*** 0.060*** 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.013 0.043*** 0.013
Cov -0.386*** -0.396*** -0.378*** -0.377***
Rlr 0.299*** 0.316*** 0.356*** 0.373*** 0.159*** 0.179*** 0.153*** 0.175***
Ylr -0.178*** -0.182*** 0.017 0.012
Number of
observations
10 483 10 483 10 482 10 482 3099 3099 3099 3099
The trading profit (Tr) and interests pressure (cov)  variables allow to test whether the
investment behaviour of firms varies systematically with internal funds. In a “perfect” world,
external funds, issuing equity or debt, and internal funds are perfect substitutes. But assume
that there is a discrepancy between the information borrowers and lenders are provided with
(incomplete asymmetric information), then a difference between the costs of internal and
external funds appears and this difference is shown in the literature to depend upon the firm
size and the creditworthiness of the borrowing firm. The primary measure of a firm’s net
worth is the Tobin’s Q (as a proxy for expected future profitability), which is neither
available nor reliable in most transition countries. Instead, we augment the Euler equation byWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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including the two above mentioned variables, tr and cov. If a1 > 0 (and a2 < 0), investment is
sensible to the availability of internal funds, proxied by cash flows and interests pressure on
firm’s liquidity, then the capital market imperfection hypothesis holds.
It is usually assumed that credit rationing (independent from future profitability) introduces a
distorting bias against certain firms. In transition countries, one has to be aware that because
of moral hazard and adverse selection, the bias might work in a specific direction: are loss
makers more largely provided with cheap credit and more able to raise credit despite their
losses? In other words, the elasticity of investment to cash flows can be considered as
reflecting the process of budget constraint’s hardening, and the sensibility of investment to
the availability of internal funds is more the consequence of the moral hazard problem than
that of asymmetric information.
This has an important practical consequence for the a priori grouping of rationed and not
rationed firms. The degree of softness of the budget constraint is more relevant for
discriminating firms, than more traditional variables (as listed in Hubbard (1998), like the
size, number of employees, debt burden), which might fail in detecting and describing the
market imperfection at work in a transition country. Budina and alii. (2000) for instance
argue that for most studies of Western economies the intuition is that companies with a
relatively large amount of debt are more likely to face liquidity constraints, whatever their
profitability. In transition countries
14, and particularly in Bulgaria, the opposite holds.
Indebted firms are less likely to face credit rationing, but this does not imply that the market
is “perfect”. In certain transition countries, indebtedness is more a proxy for the degree of
softness of the budget constraint than for the availability of internal funds. Here the
ownership structure: domestic and private, foreign, and State-owned, was used for a priori
grouping the firms in three sub-samples.
The inclusion of the labor cost allows to take into account the bargaining between workers
and managers over the allocation of value added. If workers are able to appropriate part of the
investable surplus, a3 should be negative.
Finally the sale revenue variable captures the investment effect of output demand. The
accelerator and neoclassical models imply that a4 > 0. By proxing credit constraints with two
variables, tr and cov, we take into account that the tr coefficient may capture some of the
output demand effect on investment.
                                                     
14 Fan, Lee and Shaffer (1996), or Maurel, Brana, and Sgard (1998) provide evidence for adverse
selection in Russia: indebted firms are less profitable than firms with no indebtedness.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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The coefficients in table 4 are remarkably stable across the different specifications and have
the expected sign: negative for cov and yLr, positive for rlr and tr. These results indicate that
there is a trade-off between investment and wage increases and that any increase in output
demand has a positive impact on investment. The behaviour of State-owned firms is not
consistent with the profit maximisation hypothesis inherent in the neoclassical and
accelerator model of investment: investment increases when sales decrease; there is no trade-
off between investment and wages, which increase together with investment, while sales and
profit decrease over the same period. Both results provide evidence for persisting soft budget
constraint. Finally while foreign firms do not face an arbitrage between real investment and
wages, Hungarian private firms do.
More importantly the correlation between investment and internal funds is significant
(investment increases when internal funds are available). By assuming that the magnitude of
credit constraint is the sum of both cov and tr times their respective elasticity, it turns out that
State-owned firms are more credit constrained than private Hungarian firms and foreign
firms. A similar result is found from Czech Panel Data in Lizal and Svejnar (2001): foreign
firms invest the most. Nevertheless Czech State-owned firms continue to be provided with a
large volume of bad loans and to operate under a soft budget constraint, while in Hungary
statistical evidence shows that State investment dropped significantly and credit rationing is
quite substantial. Last but not least foreign firms have an easier access to external funds than
the other two categories of Hungarian firms.
Section 3: the crowding out hypothesis
Following a methodology introduced by Ann E. Harrisson and Margaret S. McMillan (2001),
we test the assumption that foreign borrowing, which in section 1 was found to be much
higher, may exacerbate credit constraints for the individual firms in the sector. We interact
our measure of credit constraint, cov, with the share of foreign borrowing in the sector
(cov_Fbor). This term is meant to capture “credit rationing” by lenders. We expect the
coefficient to be negative.
We add Cov_Fsal, which is cov times the share of foreign sales in the sector in order to take
into account the fact that foreign sales could make domestic firms less profitable and
therefore less able to borrow. Proceeding that way, we are able to test our crowding out
assumption via financial markets. If domestic firms are crowed out of local markets due toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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market competition, then adding this additional term should reduce or eliminate the
significance of crowding out in the financial sector.
The results are in the following table. With respect to the benchmark equation (without
cov_Fbor and cov_Fsal in table 4), all coefficients, except that of cov, remain the same. The
assumption of crowding out is validated. It has two components: crowding out via financial
market and via product market competition. In other words, foreign firms borrow more for
two reasons: they are more competitive, and have a better access to external funds (whatever
domestic or international).




















Number of observations 15378
Number of groups 5253
Wald Chi2(6) 962.56
Prob > Chi2 0.0000
We perform below in table 5b the same analysis but by assuming that State-owned firms may
exacerbate credit constraints for other firms in some sector: the assumption is clearly
rejected.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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borrowing in the sector
-0.571 -1.67
Cov_Ssal: interest pressures









Number of observations 15678
Number of groups 5253
Wald Chi2(6) 946.29
Prob > Chi2 0.0000
Conclusion
This paper highlights two measures of efficiency, computed as TFP form a Cobb-Douglas
technology, gross and net of property structure. Gross efficiency is the fixed effect in the
production function specification, which does not include property variables, while net
efficiency is net of the effect of corporate governance on the ratio of production to factors
contribution. Contrary to Laslo Halpern and Gabor Korosi (2000), who found that in the early
years of transition the link between efficiency and investment is rather loose, and that foreign
firms are more efficient, while state-owned are not significantly different from the average,
our results emphasise that both foreign and private Hungarian firms are more efficient and
invest more than State-owned firms.
Our estimate of the elasticity of efficiency with respect to investment suggests that private
firms benefit much more from an incremental investment than other firms, particularly
foreign firms. This has to be linked with the previous result of an higher than average foreign
firms investment level, and may reflect the higher marginal productivity of private domestic
firms investment.
Credit rationing applies for all categories of firms: as Lizal and Svejnar (2001), we do
consider than this results only partially corroborates the Calvo and Coricelli’s  credit crunch
hypothesis. First, all enterprises, including foreign ones, face a restricted access to external
funds, and we do not assume that foreign firms may be concerned by the credit crunch
argument. Second, State-owned firms do not have a profit maximization behaviour (theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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positive correlation between wages and investment is worse than the arbitrage assumption in
Prasnikar J. and Svejnar J. (2000)), which is not compatible with the idea that liquidity
shortage may induce a recession spiral. Nevertheless domestic private firms would benefit
from an easier access to credit.
We further investigate the possibility that Hungarian firms are crowed out by foreign
investment via financial markets, by controlling for both higher competitiveness and implied
larger market share of foreign firms. Our data validate the crowding out assumption via
financial market. Using the same methodology, we reject the possibility that State-owned
firms bad loans jeopardise investment, by crowding out more profitable and credit rationed
firms.
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ANNEX: Table 1: summary statistics
Total Assets Trading profit by employee Positive investment as a











1711060 2032121 1529834 State-owned
enterprise
147 136 94 State-owned
enterprise
6% 7% 18%
Std Dev 1.18e+07 1.47e+07 1.00e+07 Std Dev 699 618 182 Std Dev 5.04%




167746 136595 197000 Private
Domestic
enterprises




Std Dev 1341748 599839 1427095 Std Dev 3657 808 922 Std Dev 3.86%
Numb of obs 19898 3122 3259 Numb of obs 13996 1971 2504 Numb of obs 16814 3359 3259
Foreign
enterprises
936283 695960 1292782 Foreign
enterprises
594 480 666 Foreign
enterprises
66% 55% 60%
Std Dev 3453589 1959535 5375025 Std Dev 1452 798 1636 Std Dev 6.89%
Numb of obs 5906 800 1066 Numb of obs 3878 432 759 Numb of obs 5111 882 1066











351 382 250 State-owned
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Std Dev 1071 898 584 Std Dev 382 482 372 Std Dev 0.632 0.608 0.674




90 83 96 Private
Domestic
enterprises




Std Dev 183 158 211 Std Dev 518 921 314 Std Dev 0.608 0.650 0.576
Numb of obs 19502 3071 3231 Numb of obs 19483 3069 3230 Numb of obs 19377 3039 3218
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enterprises
191 166 230 Foreign
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Std Dev 453 447 497 Std Dev 620 534 492 Std Dev 0.674 0.675 0.700
Numb of obs 5776 761 1059 Numb of obs 5763 758 1059 Numb of obs 5716 749 1056William Davidson Institute Working Paper 403
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Table 1 (followed)
Net Sales Revenues Interests paid/(interests paid +
trading profit)
(cov variable)











1031624 1176310 892362 State-owned
enterprise






Std Dev 6378156 8513440 6767068 Std Dev 5.38 2.84 6.55 Std Dev 0.65 0.64 0.69
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Domestic
enterprises
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Foreign
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enterprises
10% 13% 5% Foreign
enterprises
0.08 0.13 0.04
Std Dev 5466828 1805798 9725335 Std Dev 3.78 1.85 2.59 Std Dev 0.68 0.68 0.71
Numb of obs 5860 792 1063 Numb of obs 5906 799 1065 Numb of obs 5716 749 1056
Net Sales Revenues by employee Investment = increase (decrease) in















Std Dev 9588 8152 16207 Std Dev








Std Dev 8171 5845 3962 Std Dev
Numb of obs 19431 3065 3218 Numb of obs 14612 2925 3175
Foreign
enterprises
5211 4517 5732 Foreign
enterprises
71132 65006 120596
Std Dev 11715 8581 12184 Std Dev
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